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IMPROVING THE PROVISION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
TO MICRO-ENTREPRENEURS, EMERGING FARMERS 
AND AGRIBUSINESS: LESSONS FROM KWAZULU-
NATAL 
 




Three development finance institutions (DFIs) which operate in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
province were assessed in 1996/97 to see how they could improve financial viability and 
outreach to emerging farmers, agribusiness and micro-entrepreneurs. Improved service 
quality and emphasis on mobilising savings would help clients and enable the DFIs to 
diversify their portfolios. Better access to branches and lower loan approval times (improved 
screening and administrative procedures) could also lower client transaction costs. Charging 
a suitable interest rate spread is necessary but not sufficient for lenders to achieve subsidy 
independence. Reducing arrears through stricter loan contract enforcement (borrower 
accountability for loan repayment, lower collateral specific risks, secure and transferable 
collateral) will also promote financial viability. Providing both savings and loan services 
together would reduce borrower access costs, and allow savings to serve as a form of collateral 




Past government and donor support programmes in South Africa (SA) that 
provided subsidized credit to small-scale farmers, emerging agribusinesses 
and micro-entrepreneurs to try and reduce poverty and stimulate economic 
growth have had limited success. Similar to international experience, the 
programmes suffered from limited investment in productive inputs, high 
default rates (up to 40%), lack of savings mobilisation, and limited client 
coverage (outreach) (Christodoulou et al 1993; Coetzee 1995 and Kuhn & 
Darroch, 1999). Empirical studies in the developing regions of KwaZulu-
Natal, Lebowa, Venda and KaNgwane found that high transaction costs, low 
wealth and poor debt servicing capacity impeded client use of formal credit 
(Coetzee, 1995 and Fenwick & Lyne, 1998;). Many development finance 
institutions (DFIs) also incurred high transaction costs as a result of small loan 
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sizes, poor credit control policies, fixed infrastructure costs, and technical 
assistance programmes. These costs, together with the charging of subsidised 
interest rates, meant that the DFIs were reliant on continued government 
support to remain viable (Coetzee & Vink, 1996 and Strauss Commission 
Report, 1996a). 
 
Given the poor performance of the development credit programmes, a 
Commission of Inquiry into the Provision of Rural Financial Services - the 
Strauss Commission - was appointed in 1995 to make recommendations 
aimed at improving financial services in developing regions of SA. The 
Commission recognised that DFIs needed to reduce transaction costs through 
simpler facilities, broaden the type of financial services offered (to include 
savings and transmission facilities) and to improve outreach (Strauss 
Commission Report, 1996b). However, the Commission did not evaluate the 
effectiveness of current lending technologies serving small-scale farmers, 
emerging agribusinesses and micro-entrepreneurs in SA.  
 
High levels of outreach and financial viability require innovative and cost-
effective financial technologies, implemented by well-designed DFIs, to collect 
reliable client information and to handle institutional problems (like the lack 
of formal collateral and secure and transferable property rights) when 
financing the study clientele (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1993). Given the need to more 
closely evaluate the effectiveness of financial technologies serving this 
clientele in SA, this paper aims to assess the financial technologies, outreach 
and financial viability of three DFIs serving small-scale farmers, emerging 
agribusinesses and micro-entrepreneurs in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). 
Understanding the limitations and advantages of these technologies used by 
KZN lenders may identify how these technologies and DFI policies could be 
adapted to improve access to formal financial services. 
 
The performance of the KZN DFIs will be evaluated using Yaron’s (1992) 
framework, as modified by Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997). Performance 
indicators relate to the breadth (reaching large numbers of individuals), depth 
(reaching relatively poor individuals) and quality (range of financial services 
offered and level of client transaction costs) of DFI outreach and self-
sustainability. Section two briefly reviews what is needed to successfully 
deliver financial services to clients like those served by the KZN DFIs. Section 
three reviews the study methodology and results, while policy implications 
are discussed in the conclusion.  




2.  SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INTERMEDIATION 
 
The ability to produce financial savings and loan products with substantial 
breadth, depth and quality of outreach in a financially viable way depends on 
the financial technologies used by DFIs. These technologies include the 
mechanisms for designing and administering financial products, signalling to 
market participants and the screening, monitoring and enforcing of loan 
contracts – all of which impose costs on both clients and financial institutions 
(Gonzalez-Vega et al, 1997). Loan applicants must be screened in order to try 
and limit adverse selection (borrowers being greater risks than believed when 
loans were granted) when there is a lack of client information. Loan contracts 
must also be monitored and enforced to ensure that clients meet their loan 
obligations, thereby reducing the potential for moral hazard (borrowers 
incurring greater risks during the term of a loan than anticipated by lenders) 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 1993). These problems were faced by many SA DFIs that 
incurred relatively high transaction costs as outlined above - loans were 
relatively risky as clients had insecure incomes, secure and transferable 
collateral was lacking, and lenders specialised, particularly in agricultural 
finance. Loan applicant screening and loan recovery may have been less 
rigorous as credit programmes were development orientated. Together with 
client payment boycotts, this led to poor loan recovery rates (Strauss 
Commission Report, 1996a). 
 
Client costs of dealing with DFIs include the explicit out-of-pocket costs to 
travel to lender premises, and administration fees for using financial 
products, and the implicit costs of providing information to signal credit 
worthiness, and the time spent in accessing financial products. Fenwick & 
Lyne (1998) show that rural KZN clients with relatively low literacy levels had 
difficulty coping with the often complex application and disbursal procedures 
of DFIs, while centrally located branches were difficult to access. Prohibitive 
transaction costs, concessional interest rates, and client risks may have 
reduced the supply of SA DFI financial services to low income individuals, 
with loans rather going to more wealthy borrowers. High transaction costs, 
lack of suitable collateral and income risks probably reduced the demand for 
SA DFI formal financial services, and negatively impacted outreach.  
 
Several successful DFIs in Indonesia, Asia, Latin America and Bolivia have 
reduced borrower transaction costs by establishing extensive branch networks 
and mobile banking services. Emphasis has shifted to providing both savings 
and loan products together, as empirical evidence indicated that individuals 
in rural areas do have the capacity to save.  Short-term loans with flexible loan 




financed while accounting for seasonality of cash flows. Loans have simple 
application forms and fast approval times (one to two weeks) facilitated by 
decentralised decision-making. Lenders have also reduced transaction costs 
by using effective management information systems (MISs) that can instantly 
track loan status, reducing paper work, and motivating staff with financial 
and non-financial incentives linked to quantifiable performance-based 
indicators such as number of clients, portfolio growth, branch profits and loan 
collections. In addition, branch structures have been kept lean while 
spreading costs over a large number of clients (Yaron et al, 1997). 
 
Financial technologies have focused on reducing lending risks by providing 
repeat loans to small borrower groups. Initial small loans with frequent 
repayments instil financial discipline and facilitate monitoring. Joint liability 
amongst borrowers provides a collateral substitute, with lenders requiring 
compulsory savings as a contingency fund to finance group members in 
arrears (Yaron, 1992). Lenders with more flexible loan terms have used 
character references to screen and monitor borrowers, as well as interest rate 
rebates, reputational capital, loan guarantees and warehouse receipts to 
encourage repayment and enforce contracts (Coulter & Shepherd, 1995 and 
Chaves & Gonzlez-Vega, 1996). Borrowers have been held strictly accountable 
with no new loans being granted if existing loans are not repaid. Charging 
positive real interest rates that provide a suitable spread to cover operational 
costs and the cost of funds, and protect the DFI equity base, has also 
promoted financial viability. Best practice institutions with innovative 
financial technologies and motivated management have achieved breadth, 
depth and quality of outreach with high levels of financial self-sustainability 
(Yaron, 1992) in a variety of institutional environments. However, outreach 
and financial viability goals are more likely achieved when there is a low 
inflation rate, suitable economic growth, a stable political environment, a 
credible legal system, secure and enforceable property rights, and well-
established infrastructure (Christen et al., 1994). 
 
While the above best practice financial technologies may not be directly 
transferable, DFIs in SA may benefit from adapting some of these methods to 
reduce both client and lender transaction costs, and to improve loan 
collections. The next section documents the financial technologies and 
performance of the selected KZN DFIs, emphasising both positive 
developments and how their financial technologies could be improved. 




3.  RESEARCH METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
Personnel at three DFIs (L1 to L3) with financial operations in KZN - who for 
confidentiality purposes cannot be named - were surveyed at branch, regional 
and head office level in 1996/97 to assess their financial technologies, 
outreach and financial self-sustainability. Lenders were selected on the basis 
of being major providers of financial services, having different financial 
technologies, and being part of the baseline survey conducted by the Strauss 
Commission in 1996. The DFI financial technologies, outreach and financial 
viability reflect the policy environment, the target clientele, and the objectives 
of each institution. Table 1 shows that lenders L1 and L2 were primarily 
development-orientated at the time of the survey. Lender L1, a division of a 
well-established DFI in KZN, provided working capital, medium and long-
term loans for agribusiness and farming needs, while L2 only offered 
medium-term production loans to small sugar-cane farmers. Lender L3 
financed micro-entrepreneurs that were in predominantly urban areas. Due to 
poor programme performance and donor pressure, L3 gave more attention to 
achieving financial viability from mid-1994 onwards. Both L1 and L2 had 
operated for over 18 years, a considerable time period to gain experience in 
their target market and to generate economies of scale in lending. 
 
The DFI financial technologies were assessed as to the quality of financial 
services (loan and savings terms and conditions, and proximity to clients), 
client information and contract enforcement mechanisms, and loan interest 
rates. The number of branches, average number and volumes of loans and 
savings showed breadth of outreach, while average loan size outstanding and 
average deposit size gave depth of outreach. Data on DFI productivity and 
financial viability included the value and number of loan and savings 
accounts per staff member, the subsidy dependence index (SDI - percentage 
increase in the on-lending interest rate needed to eliminate all subsidies 
received), and loan arrears (Gonzalez-Vega et al, 1997). The study lenders 
used both group and individual lending technologies. Flexible and longer-
term individual loans enabled L1 to diversify portfolio risk by financing a 
range of farming and rural agribusiness activities. Flexible repayment terms 
suited its clients’ variable income flows, and L1 had developed an innovative 
long-term graduated repayment loan product aimed at alleviating the initial 
cash flow problems facing low-equity borrowers that buy farmland. L1 also 
extended group loans to small subsistence farmers in an effort to promote 
income growth in rural KZN. These group loans reduced the costs of dealing 
with many small farmers, and promoted substantial breadth and depth of 
outreach (individual loan sizes within groups ranged from R500 to R800). 




Table  1:  Lending Technologies Used by Study Lenders in KwaZulu-
Natal, 1996/97 
 
Indicator  Development Finance Institutions 
L1 L2 L3 
General 
Years of operation  18  23  9 
Institution objective  Development Development  Financial  viability 
Loan Terms and Conditions 
Financial services  Rural loans and 
savings 
Production loans 




Lending to groups  Yes  No  Yes 
  Group size  30 – 60  n/a  4 - 6 
  Group formation  Borrower & 
lender 
n/a Borrower  & 
lender 
Individual loans  Yes  Yes  No 
Loan terms  1 - 20 years  2 & 8 years  4 - 12 months 
Loans sizes  Flexible  R4 800 
(maximum) 
R100 - R5 000 
Formal collateral required?  Yes  Yes  No 
Place of loan application Branch  Agencies  Branch 
Loan application processing  4 – 24 weeks  6 weeks  4 - 5 weeks 
Decentralisation of loan 
approval 
Moderate Moderate  Good 
Repayment frequency  Flexible  Seasonal but 
fixed 
Monthly 
Gradual increase in loan size  No  No  Yes 
Loan Interest Rates 
Nominal effective interest rate 
(per annum)a 
15% - 17%  16,5%  54% - 66% 
Savings Terms and Conditions 
Savings Voluntary  Compulsory  Compulsory 
Access to savings for personal 
use 
Good Poor  Poor 
Client Information, Screening and Contract Enforcement Technologies 
Management information 
system (MIS) 
Yes (branch)  Yes (branch)  Only at head 
office 
Use of a formal scoring model  No  No  No 
Loan monitoring and tracking  Moderate  Moderate  Good 
Client incentives/penalties  No  No  Yes 
Future loan if default on 
current loan 
No (not strict)  No (not strict)  No 
Foreclosure or repossessions  Difficult  Difficult  Yes 
Staff incentives for loan 
collection 
No No Yes 
 




In-field loan applications and seasonal loan repayments reduced borrower 
transaction costs, but the group loans tended to be inflexible in terms of the 
timing and amount of finance granted to individuals. Group formation and 
monitoring imposed high costs on both L1 and group members, as the groups 
were relatively large (30-60 members) and members were geographically 
dispersed. This reduced the quality of financial services and negatively 
affected L1’s financial performance. 
 
Lender L2 specifically targets the establishment of small sugar-cane growers 
in communal areas of KZN, only providing individual medium-term 
production loans. Seasonal loan repayments were automatically deducted by 
sugar mills at crop delivery, thereby lowering administration and loan 
collection costs for L2, and transaction costs for its clients. Borrowers, 
however, were able to deliver on non-borrowers’ quota (often members of the 
same household that each had sugarcane quota but did not borrow from L2), 
thus making the crop cession system less effective. Limited branch networks 
in major rural towns increased borrower costs to access agribusiness and farm 
financial services at L1 and L2. Loan approval processing times were lengthy 
due to moderate decentralisation of loan approval responsibility. Loan 
disbursals were in-kind, with L1 clients being supplied with the physical 
inputs, while L2 clients had to collect order slips from the local sugar mill and 
present them at input suppliers. This gave clients less financial flexibility, 
since many needed finance for consumption smoothing and not just 
investment purposes. 
 
Lender L3 lent only to client groups, providing cash loans with distinct loan 
ceilings to comply with Usury Act exemptions (loans may not exceed R6 000, 
or run longer than 36 months, and must be disbursed in cash). Short loan 
terms with strict monthly repayments suited the more regular income flows of 
its micro-enterprise clients, and promoted frequent borrower-lender contact 
necessary for group monitoring. The groups tended to be small and 
homogeneous which encouraged group cohesion but, as with L1, they had set 
sizes and repayment schedules, and imposed costs on the members who were 
mainly responsible for forming the group. The frequent borrower-lender 
interaction required by L3, and its limited branch network, created additional 
costs for both parties. Loan funds had to be requested from the Pretoria head 
office which, together with investments in group-formation, lengthened 
approval times. For security reasons L3 kept no funds at local branches. While 
this improved security at these branches, clients incurred more transaction 
costs as loans were issued as cheques that then had to b e  c a s h e d  a t  a  
commercial bank. 




The relatively high costs of administering group loans, and inflexible loan 
terms, reduced the quality of L3’s financial services, and negatively affected 
its financial viability. The effective interest rate for L3 was relatively high and 
consistent with its financial self-sustainability objectives compared to the farm 
and agribusiness lenders, who charged nominal effective interest rates well 
below the ruling commercial prime overdraft rates of 18 to 19 per cent per 
annum. This suggests that L1 and L2 are unlikely to be financially self-
sufficient without changing their financial technologies. Higher interest rates 
are consistent with the costs and risks of serving small borrowers that have 
variable incomes and limited collateral. 
 
Only the development finance corporation that runs L1 was permitted by 
special government concession to mobilise client savings. This was done via 
an extended branch network, thus lowering transaction costs for clients 
depositing and accessing money. However, not all of the savings branches 
offered agricultural and agribusiness loan services. Both time and demand 
deposits could be withdrawn and made at any branch.  Savings products are 
easy to understand as interest rates are quoted in Rand terms to help clients 
understand the concept of interest, and encourage savings. Cash loans of up 
to 90 per cent of the value of time deposits were offered to depositors. 
Lending against deposits could be a viable alternative for rural clients who do 
not earn fixed incomes but may need cash for emergency purposes. Savings 
and loans facilities should be offered at the same branch or institution if 
savings are to be effectively used as collateral. This is contrary to the Strauss 
Commission recommendations that the savings and loan functions be 
managed separately by the South African Post Office and the ‘reformed’ Land 
Bank (Strauss Commission Report, 1996b: 14-17). A ‘one-stop-shop’ approach 
may also lower client transaction costs, and has been successfully used by 
several best practice DFIs in Bolivia, Indonesia, Benin, Togo and Cameroon 
(Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997 & Gurgand et al., 1994). This may be considered by 
L3 whose clients are required to open a club savings account at a commercial 
bank that may not necessarily be the bank where they cash loan cheques. 
Lender L2 also required compulsory savings, but these funds could be used 
only to purchase crop inputs. 
 
Lenders L1 and L2 had well-developed management information systems 
(MISs) at branch level to handle administrative work and facilitate loan 
tracking. Loan officers at L3 indicated that the lack of comprehensive branch 
MISs made credit control less effective. Moderate loan monitoring - in terms 
of loan officer visits - was carried out by L1 owing to the geographic 
dispersion of its clients. Lender L3 had frequent monitoring through monthly 




and L2 to encourage borrowers to repay loans tended to follow commercial 
debt contracts with formal collateral and equity contributions being required 
by L1. These financial technologies limited the access by poorer borrowers to 
finance, but were needed to counter high loan losses and low interest rates. 
 
The joint liability mechanisms used by L1 to reach small farmer and 
agribusiness clients were not effective in controlling default as the groups 
were quite large and weakly constituted, and members were geographically 
disbursed and prone to systematic income shocks. The absence of secure and 
transferable property rights, high collateral specific risks and a costly legal 
system made it difficult for L1 to foreclose on defaulting clients with larger 
individual loans. Loan repayment boycotts were also cited as a problem by 
L1. Lender L2 required the financed crop as security, but flawed collection 
mechanisms at the sugar mills reduced the efficacy of this collateral type, 
resulting in relatively high arrears, which jeopardised L2’s financial viability. 
Following international best-practice, L3 aimed to build client ‘reputational 
capital’ by offering larger loans with better terms and conditions upon timely 
repayment of existing loans. In addition, group members were denied access 
to future credit if loans from group members were in arrears. This technology 
reduces formal collateral requirements, but depends critically on the social 
interaction between group members and the extent to which group members 
value the lender’s services and want to build reputational capital (Gonzalez-
Vega et al., 1997). The relatively inflexible group loans, and the transaction 
costs of cashing loan cheques at commercial banks, may have reduced client 
incentives to maintain a good borrower-lender relationship with L3. Lenders 
L1 and L2, although promoting a policy of not granting future loans to 
defaulting clients, were more lenient, thus limiting the role of reputational 
capital as a form of collateral.  
 
Table 2 outlines outreach, productivity and financial viability data that the 
three lenders were prepared to provide. Data concerning client retention 
(repeat loans) were not available at the time of the study. Lender L2 had the 
greatest outreach in terms of the average number of loans outstanding - partly 
due to the active small-scale farmer extension efforts of local sugar mills. 
Although L1 had 44 branches in total, only 15 branches offered agricultural 
and agribusiness loans. In contrast, L1 had reached relatively fewer emerging 
farmers and agribusinesses, but these clients probably had larger asset bases 
and better liquidity as shown by the larger average loan size outstanding.  
 
For L3, high client transaction costs to apply for loans at the limited branch 
network, costly group formation, and rigid group loan terms probably 








L1 L2 L3 
Scale of Outreach      
Number of branches  15  20  12 
Average number of loans outstanding  4669  25 500  3342 
Average number of savings accounts  495 620  25 500  N/a 
Depth of Outreach      
Average loan size outstanding  R10 388  R3 055  R618 
Average value of savings account  R467  R403  N/a 
Productivity      
Average value of loans per staff member  R673 616  R708 188  R129 117 
Average number of loans per staff member  65  231  209 
Average value of savings per staff member  R674 198  R93 608  N/a 
Average number of savers per staff member  1 444  231  N/a 
Financial Self-sustainability      
SDI 54%a  112% - 294%  N/a 
Arrears 36%b 31%b 15%c 
 
a  Applies to L1 as a whole and not only to the agricultural division 
b  Arrears = annual average amount of principal and interest overdue/annual 
average loan principal outstanding 
c  Portfolio at risk = annual average outstanding balance of all loans/annual 
average total outstanding balance 
 
outreach, indicating that rural clients do have the capacity to save, and that 
there is considerable scope for savings mobilisation in rural KZN. Lenders L2 
and L3 also have considerable depth of outreach as shown by their small 
average outstanding loan sizes. Staff productivity has been relatively high in 
loan value terms for L1, in value and loans per staff member for L2, and in 
loan numbers for L3. 
 
The SDI calculations imply that an increase in on-lending interest rates to 25 
per cent per annum for L1, and to 34-63 per cent per annum for L2, are 
required for them to operate without subsidies. Their relatively high rates of 
arrears, indicating difficulty in controlling default with their current 
technologies, will also need to be reduced. outreach, indicating that rural 
clients do have the capacity to save, and that there is considerable scope for 
savings mobilisation in rural KZN. Lenders L2 and L3 also have considerable 




Staff productivity has been relatively high in loan value terms for L1, in value 
and loans per staff member for L2, and in loan numbers for L3. 
The SDI calculations imply that an increase in on-lending interest rates to 25 
per cent per annum for L1, and to 34-63 per cent per annum for L2, are 
required for them to operate without subsidies. Their relatively high rates of 
arrears, indicating difficulty in controlling default with their current 
technologies, will also need to be reduced. 
 
High administration costs and arrears negatively affect the financial viability 
of L3 which effectively loses 30 per cent of annual amounts disbursed with an 
85 per cent repayment rate, given the short term nature of its loans. Group 
lending programmes are costly to maintain, while greater economies of scale 
are needed to reduce administration costs. Both L1 and L2 were making 
substantial structural and operating changes at the time of the survey. Lender 
L1 was incorporating a new banking MIS system to improve loan tracking 
and administration. Access to financial services was being improved by 
making all products available at all branches. Lender L2 was moving away 
from sector specific lending to establishing financial service co-operatives 
which offer a broad range of financial services (loans, savings and 




The financial technologies of the three lenders varied due to their different 
target markets and different lending objectives. However, these technologies 
and the institutional environment in which they operate need some reform to 
improve access by farmer, agribusiness and micro-enterprise clients to 
financial services on a sustainable basis. Firstly, expanding branch networks 
and better rural infrastructure would reduce client transaction costs.  This, 
however,  would be costly, and increases the importance of achieving 
economies of scale, particularly for the micro-enterprise lender in the study. 
Mobile branches or agencies may be a viable alternative to ‘bricks and mortar’ 
branches, and must be located in areas frequently visited by clients, such as 
grocery stores, village markets or input suppliers. Study lenders could also 
shorten loan approval times by using computer aided screening procedures, 
decentralised decision making, a well-motivated staff (through bonus 
incentive schemes), and appropriate information systems. Their financial 
services would closer match client needs if savings and loan facilities were 
offered together (‘one-stop-shop’ facility), with more flexible loan terms.  
 
Savings (fixed deposits) could provide an alternative form of collateral for 




reliable incomes against which to borrow consumption credit. This will not be 
possible where separate savings and credit institutions exist, as lenders then 
lack information about the savings behaviour of potential borrowers. Lender 
L1’s success in mobilising savings shows that the study clientele in KZN have 
considerable capacity to save. Savings mobilisation, though, requires 
considerable institutional capacity and savings products that easily 
communicate the concept of interest to relatively illiterate clients. Continued 
outreach over time can be promoted by achieving a suitable interest rate 
spread while controlling default and administration costs. The implicit 
interest rate subsidies offered by the farm and agribusiness lenders cast some 
doubt on whether they can become financially self-sufficient. A change in 
target market - for example to include viable non-farm rural enterprises – 
could reduce their loan default rates. More use of formal scoring models 
and/or local individuals aware of borrowers’ credit histories, may improve 
client selection. Institutional and legal reform to promote secure and tradable 
property rights and effectively enforce contract penalties for defaulters may 
enhance loan security in rural areas and improve access of farming and 
agribusiness clients to formal credit.  
 
Stricter enforcement of the policy of no repeat loans at more favourable terms 
(larger amounts, longer repayment periods and reduced interest rates) if 
present loans are not repaid can build client reputational capital and induce 
voluntary contract enforcement. More effective use of credit bureaus that 
divulge borrower repayment histories to other financial institutions would 
also build reputational capital across lenders. Joint liability mechanisms have 
worked less effectively for large agricultural groups, emphasising the need for 
properly constituted groups where individuals live in close proximity and 
have sufficiently diversified income sources to cope with systematic shocks. In 
addition, joint liability alone may not ensure loan repayment when the client-
lender relationship is undermined by low quality financial services and 
lenders are lenient toward default. Study lenders, particularly the micro-
enterprise lender, must focus on offering quality financial services while also 
meeting the broader needs of the clients through more flexible loan products. 
The costs of administering financial technologies may be reduced via 
appropriate management information systems at branch level, giving staff 
performance incentives and achieving sufficient scale of operations. Staff 
performance incentives must be based on measurable criteria such as branch 
profits, client outreach and loan collections. 
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